Defeasible argumentation is concerned with studying plausible but, at the same time, fallible patterns of reasoning. Because plausible arguments can easily be developed, and not all of them can be in force at the same time, the main thrust of the theory is in deriving sound principles for adjudicating among conflicting lines of argumentation. In this paper, we propose to resolve such conflicts by starting an artificial debate. The explanatory notes will consist of a short introduction to 'traditional' defeasible argumentation, followed by a brief exposition of the basic ideas of what is called formal defeasible dialectics here. The paper will be concluded by proving the traditional and dialectic approach to be equivalent.
Introduction
This paper attempts to show that a disputational method of argument-dialectics-offers a natural approach to the theory of defeasible argumentation.
Originally arising from classical epistemology, the theory of defeasible argumentation has been developed to a serious research issue, mainly due to work of philosophers in the sixties. 1 After that, AI-researchers went through it again, calling it nonmonotonic reasoning. The AI-approach is quite different, though. 2 In principle, defeasible argumentation is concerned with drawing conclusions that might be overridden in a later stage when new information comes available. Because defeasible conclusions are reached by means of defeasible proofs, or arguments, the analysis of defeat among arguments is the first interesting problem to deal with. The second interesting problem concerns the procedure by which arguments are to be developed. At this point, there is a variety of possibilities, yet most can be subsumed under the following three categories.
Roughly, there are three ways to develop arguments. First, there is declarative argumentation, 1 Cf. work of Chisholm (1977) , Pollock (1974 Pollock ( , 1991 , Lehrer and Paxson (1969) , and Sosa (1970) . 2 Cf. Artificial Intelligence no. 13 (1980) , an overview article of Reiter in ARCS (1987) , and 'Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning,' issued by Morgan Kaufmann (1987) . Articles bordering defeasible argumentation and nonmonotonic reasoning are published by Loui (1987) , Konolige (1988) , , and Lin and Shoham (1989). in which arguments are simply declared to be in force (cf. work of Loui, 1987 , and Horty and Thomason, 1988) . Then there is progressive argumentation (or forward reasoning) in which arguments are developed bottom-up (cf. work of Reiter, 1980) . And, finally, there is regressive argumentation, (or backward reasoning) in which arguments are developed top-down (cf. work on defeasible PROLOG by . All these methods have their specific advantages and disadvantages, which will be briefly touched upon in the rest of this paper. Now, in addition to these three possibilities, we think that there is yet another way to raise arguments, namely by setting up an artificial debate. What is new about this fourth possibility is that ideas of defeasible argumentation and classical dialectics (conceived as a disputational method of argument) are brought together in what might be called formal defeasible dialectics. Despite the work that has been done on defeasible argumentation, the theory of defeasible dialectics is as yet little developed, and the literature on the subject is still relatively small. As far as we know, the relevant works content themselves with superficial allusions only. Recently, however, there is progress, witness forthcoming work of Loui (1991) , and work of Prakken (1991) . They acknowledge the importance of bringing together these two disciplines as well.
Why should defeasible argumentation be in need of defeasible dialectics? In which manner does it contribute to the theory of defeasible reasoning in general, and what would there be so new about it? Let us try to give a decent answer to each of these questions in the following two paragraphs.
The main advantage of the dialectic approach is that it deals with arguments in the original manner-as we do ourselves. Let us mention three important results of this approach.
1. Transparent procedure. An immediate result is that, in contrast with the declarative approach, we can follow and understand exactly how an argument is established in the course of a debate. This is because most elementary dialectic maneuvers and their names (like thesis, rebuttal, concession, burden of proof, etc.) are common property.
Deliberate search.
A second result is that, in contrast with forward reasoning, it is possible to set up a debate for one specific thesis (or query, or nonmonotonic theorem) and deliberately search for relevant arguments. This may initiate other debates, but these are all connected to the main one. In any case, there is no pointless breadth-first argument generation.
Provisional conclusions.
A third result is that a debate may always be interrupted halfway to obtain an intermediate answer. This is because, in a dialectic setup, arguments are raised before they can be defeated. Thus, by improving a 'first shot,' there is always a provisional conclusion. And the availability of provisional conclusions is very essential in the presence of limited resources.
What is new about defeasible dialectics is that it is not a game-theoretic reformulation of deductive logic, but a formalism that enables a real exchange of fallible or, in current terms, defeasible arguments. This in contrast with formal dialogue logic, in which the notion of argument is not even properly defined. 3 Instead, formal dialogue logic assumes that a debate is an exchange of statements (rather than arguments), and it is a well known result in this theory that every debate in formal dialogue logic, i.e. every properly conducted exchange of statements, can be transformed into a deductive proof. In other words, formal dialogue logic argues on a deductive basis, and that is exactly what the theory of defeasible reasoning is trying to surpass.
A brief word on the import of classical dialectics. In order not to turn over the entire literature, we confine ourselves by remarking that the discipline has an enormous historical background, even within the present limited definition. 4 Here, we mainly draw upon Rescher's excellent monograph (1977) .
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. After presenting the background formalism in Section 2, the declarative formalism will be developed in Section 3. This might be considered the 'traditional' approach. Then, in Section 4, the basic ideas behind the dialectic approach will be discussed, after which they will be formalised in Section 5. In Section 6, the formalism will be illustrated by means of a couple of examples. After explaining the importance of relevance in efficient debating in Section 8, the declarative and the dialectic approach will be proven equivalent in Section 9 and Section 10. Section 11 is a brief conclusion.
Background formalism
First, we will have to introduce the notion of an abstract argumentation system. 5 This formalism is a static framework on which different ideas on argumentation can be worked out. 6 In particular, it does not in and of itself prescribe how argumentation should be performed, or how defeasible information should be managed. Instead, it will serve as a starting point for the development of two different argumentation methods. (Cf. Section 3 and 5, respectively.) DEFINITION 2.1. An abstract argumentation system A is a triple (L,R, ≤) where L is a language, R is a set of rules of inference, and ≤ is a reflexive and transitive order on arguments.
The prefix abstract will often be omitted for the sake of brevity. Sometimes we wish to read the letter A in extension, meaning that we do not want to denote the argumentation system itself, but rather the arguments enabled by it, positioned in accordance with ≤.
The symbol ⊥ is used to denote contradictions. The language L is not subject to particular constraints. Any set will do, provided it contains a distinguished element representing the contradiction.
The rules R are given in terms of L and determine what inferences are possible. DEFINITION 2.3. Let L be a language.
1.
A strict rule is a formula of the form φ 1 ,...,φ n → φ with φ 1 ,...,φ n a finite sequence in L and φ a member of L.
2.
A defeasible rule is a formula of the form φ 1 ,...,φ n ⇒ φ with φ 1 ,...,φ n a finite sequence in L and φ a member of L.
A rule is a strict rule or a defeasible rule.
It is essential to understand that rules, being rules of inference are not part of the language itself.
sub (σ) = {σ}. or 2. A formula of the form σ 1 ,...,σ n → φ with σ 1 ,...,σ n a finite sequence of arguments, φ not in 7 An argument is defeasible if it is not strict.
Note that the terminology is such that every argument is either strict or defeasible, but never both.
DEFINITION 2.9. Let L be a language and let P be a subset of L. An argument σ is based on P if prem (σ) is included in P. A member of L is strictly based on P if it is the conclusion of some strict argument based on P. A member of L is defeasibly based on P if it is the conclusion of some defeasible argument based on P.
The third and last slot of an argumentation system is the order on arguments. All defeasible logics operate by means of a mechanism of defeat that computes relationships of conclusive force among arguments. But, no matter how complicated such a mechanism of defeat might be, in the end all comes down by telling which argument should overrule the other. DEFINITION 2.10. Let σ and τ be arguments. If σ ≤ τ, then τ is as good as σ, and if σ < τ, then τ is better than σ. An order of conclusive force should satisfy, besides reflexivity and transitivity, three additional specific constraints.
1. Upwards-well-foundedness (informally: principle of finite outbidding). There are no infinite chains σ 1 < σ 2 < ... < σ n < ... ;
2. Monotonic non-increase of conclusive force. If σ τ, then τ ≤ σ, for all σ and τ;
3. Strict propagation of conclusive force. If σ 1 ,...,σ n → σ, then σ i ≤ σ, for some 1≤i≤n.
The first constraint ensures that, roughly, defeat will be a finite process. The second and third constraints ensure that the notion of conclusive force is distributed properly over arguments. 8 Once more, it is emphasised that we purposively abstain from telling how and why any particular argument should overrule the other. That is why we speak of abstract argumentation systems. Nevertheless, the following example presents some specific instantiations of conclusive force. 9 7 Cf. Definition 2.5.2, last sentence. 8 As a matter of fact, these constraints are not needed here, but they are essential in the extended framework that relies heavily on the assurance of finite defeat (cf. work on abstract argumentation systems, Vreeswijk, 1991). 9 For an extensive treatment on this complicated issue, we refer to work of Prakken (1991 3. Preferring the most specific argument. For all σ and τ we have σ < τ if σ is defeasible and τ is strict, or σ and τ are both defeasible, but the premises of σ are based on the conclusions of subarguments of τ, i.e. prem (σ) is based on conc°sub (τ). As it stands, this order does not fit in the shackles of Definition 2.10, but if arguments are bound to be finite, then all constraints will be met.
This example completes the definition of abstract argumentation systems.
We now turn to the notion of compatibility. Compatibility is the shadow concept of consistency. However, we are not working in a traditional context, so the term consistency would be slightly out of place here.
Then all subsets of { p, q, s}, { p, r}, and {q, r} are compatible, while all supersets of { p, q, r}, and {r, s} are incompatible.
Compatibility naturally extends to sets of arguments. Thus, a set of arguments Σ is compatible if conc (Σ) is compatible.
We now turn to the notion of base set. DEFINITION 2.14. A base set is a finite compatible subset of L.
A base set contains 'irreducible information'. It is the point of departure in forward argumentation, and the final stopping place in backward justification. Examples of base sets are data bases, scientific libraries, subjective observations, first principles in a case study or, in dialectic terms, a shared basis of initial concessions in debating.
Declaration of warrant
The declarative approach, as we shall deal with it here, simply declares which arguments are in force, and which conclusions are warranted. An immediate consequence is that there is no reasoning and, hence, no appeal to argumentation policies or formal dialectics. 10 The entire theory is set at once. 11 Within this approach, the theory revolves around the definition that declares which argument is in force and which is not. Let us first give the definition, and then explain it. DEFINITION 3.1. Let P be a base set. An argument σ is in force on basis of P, written P | ∼ σ, if 1. The set P contains σ; or 2. For some arguments σ 1 ,...,σ n we have P | ∼ σ 1 ,...,σ n and σ 1 ,...,σ n → σ; or 3. For some arguments σ 1 ,...,σ n we have P | ∼ σ 1 ,...,σ n and σ 1 ,...,σ n ⇒ σ and every set of arguments Σ that is in force on basis of P and such that σ is not better than any member of Σ, is compatible with σ.
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DEFINITION 3.2. Let P be a base set. Then info (P) denotes the set of arguments {σ | P | ∼ σ}.
Let us concentrate on Definition 3.1 as it stands. We see that it consists of three clauses. The first clause simply ensures that P is in force. The second clause, though simple as well, is imposing an important condition on info (P): it requires that info (P) is closed with respect to strict argumentation. In this manner, the property of being in force propagates through strict arguments. This may sound straightforward, but there are theories in which the application of a strict rule is subject to certain conditions. The third clause forms the heart of Definition 3.1. Note that it is similar to the second clause, upto the additional condition on P and σ. The rationale behind this additional condition is that σ cannot be in force if it is incompatible with a set Σ of relatively strong arguments that is in force.
For certain sets of rules, Definition 3.1 is circular, so that info (P) is not uniquely determined.
What is more, the set info (P) might not exist at all. This is not a flaw in the theory, but simply a manifestation of a restrained mechanism of defeat. In fact, theory formation on argumentation systems would be a lot easier if we could depart from the assumption that there is always rigorous defeat. Unfortunately, that is not the case. 13 In the end, we are interested in the conclusions of the arguments which are in force. An element of L is warranted if it is the conclusion of an argument that is in force. DEFINITION 3.3. Let P be a base set. Then warrant (P) denotes the set conc°info (P).
The term 'warranted' is borrowed from Pollock (1991) : "a proposition is warranted in an epistemic situation if and only if an ideal reasoner starting from that situation would be justified in believing the proposition".
To understand how all this works in practice, here are two examples. 
and with a basic order on arguments (cf. Example 2.11). Let P = { p}. Our goal is to determine which elements are warranted on basis of P. According to Definition 3.3 it suffices to determine which arguments are in force on basis of P. To begin with, Definition 3.1 (i) together with p ∈P immediately yields P | ∼ p. So p, considered as an argument, is in force. Next, let us examine whether the argument p ⇒ q is in force. According to Definition 3.1 we
(ii) the rule p ⇒ q is in R, and (iii) every set of arguments Σ that is in force (on basis of P) and such that p ⇒ q is not better than any member of Σ, is compatible with p ⇒ q. Since conditions (i) and (ii) are clearly fulfilled, condition (iii) remains to be examined. To begin with, (iii) can be simplified by observing that (iii) holds if and only if every set Σ of defeasible arguments based on P which is in force, is compatible with p ⇒ q.
Since p ⇒ r is the only argument which may cause (iii) not to hold if it is in Σ, condition (iii) can be simplied further by stating that (iii) holds if and only if not P | ∼ p ⇒ r. Consequently, 12 Clearly, with P | ∼ σ 1 ,...,σ n we mean P | ∼ {σ 1 ,...,σ n } which, on its turn, means P | ∼ σ 1 , . . . , P | ∼ σ n . 13 Two excellent examples of theories that rest on the assumption of rigorous defeat are (i) the logic for defeasible reasoning LDR , and (ii) the semi-formal but ingenious formalism of defeat proposed in (Loui, 1987) . Because these theories presuppose unique defeat, there are no difficulties in telling which argument is in force and which is not. Both systems may be classified as bellicose (i.e. eager to defeat). A good example of pacifistic argumentation is (Naess, 1966) . According to Naess, arguments pro and contra should exist side by side, not to sow discord, but simply to tabulate as many arguments for and against as possible.
Because the argumentation system A considered here is symmetric in the variables q and r, the same line of reasoning goes through for p ⇒ r. 14 Hence, P | ∼ p ⇒ r if not P | ∼ p ⇒ q. Combining this with the previous result yields P | ∼ p ⇒ q if and only if not P | ∼ p ⇒ r. Put differently, the set info (P) is one of { p, p ⇒ q} and { p, p ⇒ r}. As a result we have that p is warranted and, moreover, q is warranted if and only if r is not warranted. EXAMPLE 3.5. Consider the argumentation system A as defined in Example 3.4, but now with rules
Because the addition of the rules {q → s, r → s} to the set of rules 3.4 (1) has no influence on the criteria on which we concluded that P | ∼ p ⇒ q if and only if not P | ∼ p ⇒ r, we still have either p ⇒ q or p ⇒ r in force, but not both. If the argument p ⇒ q is in force, Definition 3.1 (ii) together with P | ∼ p ⇒ q and q → s ∈R yields P | ∼ p ⇒ q → s. Similarly, P | ∼ p ⇒ r and r → s ∈R and Definition 3.1 (ii) would yield P | ∼ p ⇒ r → s. In any case, the element s is the conclusion of an argument in force in A. Thus, the element s is warranted. However, we are unable to tell by which argument s actually is supported. 
Defeasible dialectics-basic idea
Assuming an argumentation system A on the background, the question is whether a specific thesis φ is tenable relative to a fixed base set P.
To find out, a proponent P P and opponent O O start a debate that proceeds along the rules of defeasible dialectics. This goes as follows. The proponent P P opens the debate by stating φ, together with a supporting argument σ. The proponent's task now is to defend σ, and all subarguments of σ, against possible counterarguments. After P P has made 'his' argument, it is up to O O to refute it. If O O doesn't, P P wins. The opponent O O may attack P P's thesis as follows. First, O O chooses a particular subargument σ′ of σ, and asks P P whether σ′ holds. If P P doesn't want to lose, P is forced to state σ′ and defend it. Once P P is committed explicitly to σ′, the opponent O O may attack σ′ by putting forward a finite list of counterarguments τ 1 ,...,τ n . Together, these arguments stand against σ (redundancy is allowed). As a result, the burden of proof is shifted from O O to P P, because O O has to defend all of τ 1 ,...,τ n against attacks from P P. Now it is up to P P to attack a particular subargument of one of τ 1 ,...,τ n , in the same manner as was done by the opponent.
This exchange of arguments continues until, let us say, O O is unable to rebut an argument of P P. For example, if O O is unable to rebut the last argument of P P, then P P is allowed to do away with the last rebuttal of O O, whereafter O O has the opportunity to come up with a new rebuttal, and the procedure continues. If O O is unable to forward new rebuttals, then P P is allowed to do away with the penultimate rebuttal of O O, and so on.
The debate is lost by the party that is unable to put forward new rebuttals.
To fully appreciate the intention of the present proposal, it is important to understand that the prime aim is not to beat a rival contender, but to test a contention through the process of setting out the lines of reasoning by which these considerations are in turn met and countered. Following Rescher, one might call this unilateral dialectics. 16 With some benevolence, such a self-contained procedure might be compared with the workings of the human arm that is able to move by protagonist-antagonist pairs of muscles also. The point we want to make here is that a complex of counterbalanced forces enables a subtle mechanism that works by principle of opposition.
Defeasible dialectics-formalism
Formally, we proceed as follows. It should be mentioned that the present formalism operates on basis of other principles than what is customary in formal dialogue logic.
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Prerequisites
For a defeasible debate, we need an abstract argumentation system A, a shared basis P, where P is a base set, and a thesis φ. 18 Moreover, there is a proponent P P and an opponent O O.
Possible moves
Both P P and O O may perform three kinds of moves. They may state one or more theses (together with supporting arguments), pose a question, or give an answer. The party stating the theses is the defender of them, and is denoted by D D; the other party is the attacker, and is denoted by A A. Both P P and O O may take in these positions.
First move-to open a debate
A debate is always opened by P P, stating the main theses (together with supporting arguments), as follows.
Almost always, we have a main thesis, i.e. n =1. With the first move, P P commits itself to σ 1 ,...,σ n , and should defend them if O O presses the point. The !-sign has no further intensional impact; it is merely used to denote free moves. In particular, an exclamation mark does not change the meaning of the arguments involved.
The number of bars before the line number denotes the level of the debate. (Later, it will be shown that the theory of level-n arguments is connected to this concept. 19 ) Finally, to avoid pointless repetitions (or intentional filibuster), there is the rule that, for each party, an answer may not be rebutted twice the same way. As we shall see, this rule is a tiebreaker in circular debating. 20 (Cf. Example 6.2.)
What is a debate?
A debate is a (possibly infinite) sequence of moves, such that every thesis (or list of theses) is followed by a question, every question is followed by an answer, and every answer is, if possible, followed by a thesis (or a list of theses).
Note that the present notion of debate (without shortcuts) can only stop if an answer really has no rebuttal.
Shortcuts
The moves just given are sufficient to set up a debate. The present arsenal, however, has a rigid setup and forces us to go through several trivial combinations of moves. Therefore, the following shortcuts are introduced. Note that shortcuts leave parity unaltered.
Last move-to win a debate
If a debate ends, there is always a winner and a loser. The winner of a debate is the party that has made the last move. There are two ways of making the last move, whether that is the last move of local debate or of a global debate.
Winning on substantial grounds.
If a debate is won on substantial grounds, the winning party (which, in this case, is always the defender) gave an answer to which the other party was not able not respond. Moreover, if the losing party has lost a sub-debate, this was on substantial grounds as well. In this case, the defender wins on basis of arguments.
Winning on procedural grounds.
In this case, the other party was able to respond, but did not so. Either because it was not permitted by procedure (lack of time, broken off by adjudicator, etc.), or else because, for some reason, the loser decided to quit. (The losing party may, however, continue to defend earlier theses.)
If the defender does not lose, the theses are said to be defended successfully. (Note what happens if a party defends his theses successfully, without being able to win.) A list of theses can be defended successfully on substantial grounds as well on procedural grounds. In both cases, the debate has an odd length. If the attacker wins, the theses are said to be attacked successfully. In that case, the debate has an even length. (As opposed to the defender, the attacker must really win, before it may shift the burden of proof to the defender.)
The party that performed the last move of the global debate, is declared to be the overall winner.
Examples
The following debates proceed along the rules of the dialectic formalism. EXAMPLE 6.1. Consider the argumentation system A with language L = { p, q, r} ∪ {⊥}, with rules
and with a basic order on arguments ≤ (cf. Example 2.11). Let P = { p}. Consider the following A-debate.
After P P has advanced the main thesis in line 1, O O successfully attacks the supporting argument in line 2 (without asking for subarguments). As a result, P P comes down two levels and loses the overall debate immediately. EXAMPLE 6.2. Consider the argumentation system A of Example 3.4 with language L = { p, q, r} ∪ {⊥}, with rules
and with a basic order on arguments (cf. Example 2.11). Let P = { p}. Consider the following A-debate.
After P P has advanced the main thesis in line 1, O O immediately rebuts it in line 2. Because the arguments involved are ≤-incomparable, P P can attack O O's rebuttal with the original argument of line 1. After that, there is no possibility to proceed, because the formalism does not allow for rebutting an argument twice the same way. As a result, the proponent wins the overall debate. However, because the argumentation system A is symmetric in the variables q and r, P P would have won the debate with the argument p ⇒ r as well. Thus, in this particular case, making the first move turns out to be advantageous. But then again, in other setups with circular dependencies, it may be of advantage not to open the debate. This depends on which party is restricted first by the rule that forbids identical rebuttals. EXAMPLE 6.3. Consider the argumentation system A with language
with rules
and with order ≤ such that σ 2 < σ 4 and σ 1 < σ 3 , where
Consider the following A-debate.
After P P has advanced the main thesis in line 1, O O asks for a particular subargument in line 2, which is given by P P in line 3. Then, in line 4, O O attacks the argument of line 3 by rebutting it with another argument. Once P P is committed explicitly to σ′, O O becomes the defender, while P P becomes the attacker. In line 5, P P immediately rebuts the argument of O O in line 4. Because O O comes down two levels in line 6, this is with success. Therefore, the local 4-5 debate is won by P P. Because the burden of proof is shifted back from P P to O O, the opponent continues to question subarguments of the supporting argument of the main thesis, which happens at line 6. This time, O O forces P P to concede the argument in line 7. In contrast with line 4, the opponent O O now successfully rebuts argument 7 with argument 8. Because P P has no counterarguments, P P comes down to level 0, which means that P P has lost the debate.
Limited resources
An important property of debating is that provisional conclusions can be provided for in the presence of limited resources. In this section, we briefly describe how to strike a balance at intermediate stages of a debate.
A provisional conclusion in a debate is determined by two things: the burden of proof, and the history of the debate. Let us begin defining the notion of burden of proof in precise terms.
DEFINITION 7.1. The burden of proof is the duty to rebut the adversary, on pain of losing the debate.
The burden of proof is always on the attacker. (It follows from the construction of our current notion of debate that the proponent is the attacker at even levels, while the opponent is the attacker at odd levels.) The task of the attacker is to shift the burden of proof to the adversary, by means of producing the right arguments. Now, if a debate is interrupted halfway, the attacker is saddled with the burden of proof, and lacks the opportunity of rebutting the adversary. Hence, at that point, the attacker is the provisional loser of the debate. The defender, then, is the provisional winner of the debate. EXAMPLE 7.2. Consider the A-debate of Example 6.3. In this debate, the proponent P P is the provisional winner of the debate at line 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. The opponent O O is the provisional winner of the debate at line 4 and 8. Because the debate is running over eight lines, the opponent also is the overall winner of the debate.
At every stage of a debate, there is a collection of arguments that is put forward, but not (or not yet) withdrawn. These arguments support the provisional conclusions. It remains to be argued that these conclusions endorse the temporal superiority of the provisional winner, and are an approximation of the final outcome of the debate. To understand how the final outcome might be approximated, let us see what happens if arguments are withdrawn in the course of a debate. If arguments are withdrawn, the level of the debate decreases from level n to level n −2k, for some n≥1, and for some k≥1. The theses that are put forward at level n, n −2, n −4 ,... are discharged because, after they refuted the previous theses they have done their work and are no longer needed. Accordingly, the thesis at level n −1, n −3, n −5 ,... are refuted. In effect, the theses that are put forward at level n −2k are strengthened (officially: corroborated). A list of theses is strengthened every time the arguments of a rebuttal are refuted. Now, in the course of a debate, some arguments are strengthened by failing rebuttals more than once. Every time such an argument survives a rebuttal, the probability increases that this argument is supporting the right conclusion. In this manner, a provisional conclusion may, together with other provisional conclusions, considered to be an approximation of the final outcome of a debate.
Efficient debating
Dialectic is essential as a fair control procedure in the presence of limited resources. Conversely, however, we have that limited computation demands efficient debating, that should it make possible to jump to provisional conclusions quickly.
Among others, the notion of relevance (and, therefore, the notion of irrelevance) is strongly connected to efficient debating. Irrelevance is deceptive maneuvering that leads a debate 'off track,' away from the main issue. Therefore, in consideration of computational efficiency, it is desirable to direct search to the strongest opposition, and avoid wasting resources on irrelevant arguments. If that is done, i.e. as long as every argument is relevant to the main issue, the debate is ensured to be properly aimed, and resources are likely to be well spent.
Because relevance is important, let us define it in precise terms. Intuitively, an argument σ is relevant to τ if it matters to know whether σ is in force in order to determine whether τ is in force. Obviously, if σ′ σ, then σ′ is relevant to σ. And with this, every argument that is relevant to σ′ is relevant to σ. So relevance is transitive. Moreover, if Σ interferes with σ, it matters to know whether Σ is in force. Formally, the definition is as follows. DEFINITION 8.1. Let A be an abstract argumentation system, and let σ be an argument in A.
The set relevant (σ) is the smallest set of arguments such that 1. The argument σ is in relevant (σ);
2. For every subargument σ′ of σ, the set relevant (σ′) is a subset of the set relevant (σ);
3. Every set of arguments Σ that is minimally incompatible with σ and such that σ is not better than any member of Σ, is a subset of relevant (σ).
The notion of relevance naturally extends to sets of arguments. Thus, for every set of arguments Σ, we define relevant (Σ) = ∪ {relevant (σ) | σ∈Σ}. If σ∈relevant (Σ), we say that σ is relevant to Σ. EXAMPLE 8.2. Consider the argumentation system A with language
and with the ⇒ -count order on arguments (cf. 3. For every Σ, we have that relevant°relevant (Σ) ⊆ relevant (Σ).
That is, the operation of taking relevant arguments is reflexive, monotonic, and idempotent.
PROOF. The first two inclusions readily follow from Definition 8.1. To prove the third inclusion, it suffices to show that, for every argument σ∈relevant (Σ), we have that relevant (σ) ⊆ relevant (Σ). This readily follows from Definition 8.1 also.
Before we discuss relevant debating, let us first establish an important and intuitively appealing result on the connection between nonmonotonicity and relevance in general. PROPOSITION 8.4 . Let A be an abstract argumentation system, let P be a base set, and let σ be an argument such that P | ∼ σ. Let Q be a subset of L such that P ∪ Q is a base set as well. Then, if P ∪ Q | ∼ σ does not hold, the set Q contains an element that is relevant to the argument σ.
PROOF. Let us prove the converse: if Q contains no elements that are relevant to σ, then we have that P ∪ Q | ∼ σ. To begin, note that our assumption says that Q ∩ relevant (σ) = ∅. Further, in order to find out whether σ is in force, we need to consult Definition 3.1. Let us call this process the resolution of the argument σ. We show that every argument that is encountered in the resolution of σ, is relevant to σ. As a result, we then know that no member of Q has part in the resolution of σ, since Q and relevant (σ) are disjoint sets. And from this it follows that, for every base set P, we have that P | ∼ σ if and only if P ∪ Q | ∼ σ.
We are left to show that the resolution of σ takes place within the set relevant (σ). To do so, we distinguish three cases. If (i) the argument σ is in L, then we need to verify whether σ is in the base set that is currently at issue, so that the resolution of σ involves nothing but σ. ..,σ n are in force, and if there exists a set Σ that is incompatible with σ and such that σ is not better than any member of Σ. As far as σ 1 ,...,σ n are concerned, this part is similar to the previous case. Concerning sets that might be incompatible with σ, it suffices to restrict our attention to those Σ which are minimal in this respect: any larger set will simply be an extension of such a minimal set. But now, at this point, we are left exactly with the third case of Definition 8.1, which stipulates that Σ ⊆ relevant (σ). We have proved that the resolution of σ takes place entirely within relevant (σ). This suffices to conclude the overall proof.
Let us return to the theory of debating. It was already explained that debates can be obscured by rebutting with arguments that are beside the point. An argument that is besides the point does not stand against the preceding answer, 'waters down' the rebuttal at issue, and could just as well be missed. Moreover, such an argument is not only an ineffective redundancy, but also an additional commitment. It commits the attacker to defend it when it is attacked by the current defender in a later stage of the debate (which might give problems if this argument happens to be weak). So a redundant commitment is a needless argument that can only be turned against the party by which is was put forward. A rebuttal that does not contain redundant commitments, might be called apt, to-the-point, or succinct. PROOF. Let us begin by noting that a debate is constituted of three kinds of moves: advancing theses, posing questions, and giving answers. We show that every argument that is advanced in every such move is relevant to one of the arguments that has been put forward in an earlier stage of the debate. The idempotency of relevance-i.e. relevant°relevant = relevant-then tells us that every argument is relevant to the main theses. So let us consider a single move. If this move consists of the advancement of certain theses, there are two possibilities: this move is the very first move of the debate, or it is not. If it is, there is nothing to be proved. If it is not, then we have a list of local theses τ 1 ,...,τ n , rebutting the answer σ that precedes it. Thus, σ is incompatible with τ 1 ,...,τ n and not better than one of τ i , for some 1≤i≤n. Further, we have confined our attention to debates with succinct rebuttals only, so that τ 1 ,...,τ n is succinct in particular. This leaves us exactly with the third case of Definition 8.1 with Σ = {τ 1 ,...,τ n }, so that all of τ 1 ,...,τ n are relevant to σ. Finally, if the move at issue is a question or an answer, it follows almost immediately from Definition 8.1 that the involved arguments are relevant to one of the arguments that has been put forward in an earlier stage of the debate.
The previous proposition basically tells us that, in order to remain relevant to the main theses, both parties should not go beyond what is necessary to rebut the adversary.
Finite argumentation systems
It will turn out in a moment that, if an argumentation system is assumed to be finite, we can establish an important result. PROOF. Because every answer is an argument, and every rebuttal is an ordered set of arguments, there are but finitely many answer-rebuttal pairs. This, together with the rule that, for each party, an answer may not be rebutted twice the same way, yields the desired result.
Equivalence result
In this section, the declarative and the dialectical approach will be proven equivalent. In a more traditional vocabulary, we might say that defeasible dialectics are sound and complete with respect to the declarative formalism. PROOF. For every argument σ, we will prove both directions of the equivalence in one turn with induction on the deepest level that is possible for a debate that opens with σ. Due to Proposition 9.3, this number may assumed to be finite; let us denote it by 〈σ〉 P . To begin with, let σ be an argument with 〈σ〉 P = 1. Actually, this means that there are no rebuttals possible, let alone that there would be successful rebuttals. This, in turn, implies that σ can be defended successfully. Moreover, because there are no rebuttals, this also implies that there are no τ 1 ,...,τ n incompatible with σ such that σ is not better than τ i , for some 1≤i≤n. This observation suffices to conclude that σ is in force. Next, suppose the equivalence is established for all arguments σ with 〈σ〉 P <n, and let σ be an argument with 〈σ〉 P = n. We will prove two implications. First we will prove that, if σ is in force, then it can be defended successfully. Second, we will prove that, if σ is not in force, then it cannot be defended successfully. To begin with, suppose that σ is in force, and that P P defends it as a main thesis. Now suppose that O O forces P P to defend a subargument σ′ of σ to rebut it with τ 1 ,...,τ n . Thus, the opponent O O has to defend τ 1 ,...,τ n . Because σ′ is incompatible with τ 1 ,...,τ n and not better than τ i , for some 1≤i≤n, one of τ 1 ,...,τ n cannot be in force.
Suppose that τ i is not in force, for some 1≤i≤n. Now if P P happens to force O O to defend aminimal subargument τ i ′ of τ i that is not in force, then O O is forced to defend τ i ′ in a debate with deepest level not exceeding n-i.e. 〈τ i ′ 〉 P < n. By our induction hypothesis, it is not possible for O O to successfully defend τ i ′. In other words, τ i ′, and hence τ i , is successfully rebutted by P P. Because this line of reasoning holds for all possible rebuttals of σ from O O, we conclude that P P is able to successfully defend σ in all A-debates. Conversely, suppose that σ is not in force. By definition, there is a finite list of arguments τ 1 ,...,τ n that is in force, that is incompatible with σ, and such that σ is not better than τ i , for some 1≤i≤n. If P P opens the debate with σ and O O chooses to rebut σ with τ 1 ,...,τ n then, by our induction hypothesis, O O can successfully defend each subargument of τ i , for every 1≤i≤n. In this situation, P P definitely loses the debate. Thus, in general, if σ is advanced as a main thesis in an A-debate, then σ cannot always be successfully defended. This completes the overall proof.
At this place, it may be in order to note that in another paper, the declarative formalism has been proven equivalent to a specific forward argumentation procedure, leaving us with three different methods for obtaining equivalent results. 22 
Conclusion
The prime purpose of this paper has been to advocate a controversy-oriented approach towards defeasible argumentation. To do so, we first presented the notion of an abstract argumentation system: a static framework, on top of which two different formalisms were developed, viz. a declarative formalism and a formal defeasible dialectics.
As we have mentioned, the declarative formalism resembles existing defeasible logics, and is therefore a useful point of reference for testing the adequacy of the dialectic formalism. This is important, because the dialectical formalism is new (for our community, anyway), and needs a certain validation (again, for our community). In this respect, the equivalence proof is, besides the examples, considered to be the main result on which we dare to claim the adequacy of the formalism in question. We do not pretend, however, that the formalisation has captured all interesting aspects of the subject. Rather, we merely wanted to show that a serious reconsideration of classical dialectic principles might be helpful in understanding defeasible argumentation.
